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Abstract
In the recent past, the reduction-based and the model-based methods to prove cut elimination have con-
verged, so that they now appear just as two sides of the same coin. This paper details some of the steps of
this transformation.
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Introduction
Many results of proof theory, such as unprovability results, completeness of vari-
ous proof-search methods, the disjunction and the witness property of constructive
proofs and the possibility to extract programs from such proofs, rely on cut elim-
ination theorems, asserting that when a proposition is provable in some theory, it
has a proof of a special form: a cut free proof.
The methods developed to prove such cut elimination theorems can be broadly
divided into two categories: the reduction-based methods and the model-based ones.
In the recent past, we have witnessed a convergence of these two kinds of methods.
In this paper, I detail some of the steps of this transformation that has lead to
consider reduction-based and model-based methods just as two sides of the same
coin.
1 The problem of the axioms
A preliminary step to the convergence of reduction-based and model-based methods
for proving cut elimination has been the deﬁnition of a suﬃciently general notion
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of cut. And this has itself required a modiﬁcation of the notion of theory.
Let us start with an example. A consequence of the cut elimination theorem
is the disjunction property: in constructive logic, when a proposition of the form
A ∨ B is provable in the empty theory, i.e. without axioms, then either A or B
is provable. Indeed, by the cut elimination theorem, if the proposition A ∨ B is
provable, it has a cut free proof. Then, a simple induction on proof structure shows
that, in constructive natural deduction, the last rule of a cut free proof in the empty
theory is an introduction. Thus a cut free proof of A∨B ends with an introduction
of the disjunction and either A or B is provable.
The fact that the last rule of a cut free proof in an introduction does not extend
when we add axioms. For instance, if A ∨B is an axiom, then this proposition has
a cut free proof that ends with the axiom rule. Thus, the disjunction property for
theories such as arithmetic or simple type theory cannot be derived, in a simple way,
from the cut elimination theorem for predicate logic. The attempts to characterize
axioms, such as Harrop formulae, that preserve the usual properties of cut free
proofs, such as the disjunction property, the witness property or the fact that the
last rule is an introduction, have led to relatively small classes, that, for instance,
never contain the axioms of arithmetic. Indeed, the cut elimination theorem for
predicate logic without axioms can be proved in arithmetic and the property that
all propositions provable in arithmetic have a proof ending with an introduction
rule implies the consistency of arithmetic. Thus, this result cannot be derived in an
elementary way from the cut elimination theorem of predicate logic.
Therefore, to prove the disjunction property for arithmetic or simple type theory,
we need to extend the cut elimination theorem ﬁrst. This explains why there are
several cut elimination theorems for various theories of interest. For instance, in
arithmetic, we usually introduce a new form of cut speciﬁc to the induction axiom,
and we prove the cut elimination theorem again for this extended notion of cut.
This necessity to introduce a speciﬁc notion of cut for each theory of interest
has been an obstacle to the development of a general theory of cut elimination.
Deduction modulo [12,15] has been an attempt to partially solve this problem. In
deduction modulo, the axioms of the form ∀x1 ... ∀xn (t = u) or ∀x1 ... ∀xn (P ⇔ A)
where P is an atomic proposition are replaced by rewrite rules t −→ u or P −→ A.
Then, deduction is performed modulo the congruence generated by these rules. If
not all, many theories can be formulated as rewrite systems: for instance arithmetic
[16,1] and simple type theory [13].
In deduction modulo, not all theories have the cut elimination property. But,
what is important is that the deﬁnition of the notion of cut is independent of the
theory of interest and asking if some theory, formulated as a rewrite system, has
the cut elimination property is now a well-formed question.
In fact, a similar idea had been investigated earlier by Dag Prawitz and others
[26,7,8,20,17] who have proposed to replace the axioms of the form ∀x1 ... ∀xn (P ⇔
A) by non logical deduction rules allowing to unfold P into A and to fold A into P .
More recently, Benjamin Wack has introduced a notion of super-natural deduction
[30,3] where the unfolding of P into A is automatically followed by all the possible
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elimination rules of the connectors and quantiﬁers of A and the folding of A into P
preceded by the corresponding introduction rules. This leads to very natural deduc-
tion rules where, like in the usual mathematical practice, connectors and quantiﬁers
almost disappear. Interestingly, the theories that have the cut elimination property
in these three formalisms are the same [10,4]. This shows the robustness of this
notion of cut.
In conclusion, it is possible to formulate a general notion of cut that applies to
all the theories that can be expressed as a rewrite system and this notion of cut is
quite robust. The deﬁnition of such a notion of cut independent of the theory of
interest has been a pre-requisite to the convergence of reduction-based and model-
based methods as, this way, a suﬃciently large class of problems to which these
methods apply, has been identiﬁed.
2 Models
2.1 Soundness and completeness
The soundness theorem asserts that for every proposition A, if A is provable in pred-
icate logic, then for every modelM, A is valid inM. Conversely, the completeness
theorem asserts that for every proposition A, if for every model M, A is valid in
M, then A is provable. In most of the proofs of the completeness theorem however,
the classically equivalent statement is proved: for every proposition A, there exists
a model M such that if A is valid in M, then A is provable.
With the usual notion of bi-valued model, it is not possible to permute the
quantiﬁers and prove that there exists a uniform model M such that for every
proposition A, if A is valid in M, then A is provable. But, if we extend the notion
of model by allowing truth values to be elements of an arbitrary boolean algebra,
then this statement becomes provable. An example of such model is the syntactic
model, where the truth values are the elements of the Lindenbaum algebra of the
language. In constructive logic, the boolean algebras need to be replaced by Heyting
algebras, but this uniform completeness theorem can still be proved.
2.2 Model-based cut elimination proofs
The model-based cut elimination proofs — for instance [27,25,29,2,9,23] — proceed
by proving a sharpened completeness theorem: for every proposition A, if for every
model M, A is valid in M, then A has a cut free proof. The cut elimination
theorem is then just a consequence of the soundness theorem and of this sharpened
completeness theorem: if a proposition has a proof then, by the soundness theorem,
it is valid in all models, hence, by the sharpened completeness theorem, it has a cut
free proof.
Olivier Hermant has shown that such a model-based method could be used
to prove cut elimination for a large class of theories in deduction modulo [21,22].
His sharpened completeness theorems are uniform: they proceed by constructing
a model M such that for all A, if A is valid in M, then A has a cut free proof.
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Notice that, when such a uniform sharpened completeness theorem is used, only
one instance of the soundness theorem is needed in the proof of the cut elimination
theorem: that corresponding to the modelM given by the sharpened completeness
theorem. Provable propositions are valid in this particular model, hence they have
a cut free proof.
3 Reductions
The reduction-based methods prove cut elimination theorems by exhibiting an al-
gorithm that transforms a proof that is not cut free, into another that is “closer” to
a cut free proof. This transformation process, called a reduction of the proof, can
be iterated and if it terminates, it yields a cut free proof.
One of the ﬁrst reduction-based cut elimination proofs is the proof of termination
of proof reduction in arithmetic using Tait’s method [28]. The idea is to prove, by
induction over proof structure, that all proofs terminate, but to let this induction go
through, it is necessary, as usual in proofs by induction, to strengthen the induction
hypothesis and to prove that all proofs verify a property stronger than termination,
called reducibility. This notion of reducibility is parametrized by the proposition
the proof is a proof of. Thus, in this proof, a notion of “being a reducible proof of
A” is deﬁned by induction over the structure of the proposition A, and then, the
fact that all proofs of A are reducible proofs of A is proved by induction over proof
structure.
An equivalent formulation uses the set of reducible proofs of A instead of the
predicate “being a reducible proof of A”. The fact that the predicate “being a
reducible proof of A” is deﬁned by induction on the structure of A then rephrases
as the fact that the set of reducible proofs of A⇒ B, for instance, is deﬁned from the
set of reducible proofs of A and that of reducible proofs of B, by applying to these
sets an binary function ⇒˜, and similarly for the other connectors and quantiﬁers.
4 From reductions to models
Bridging the gap between reduction-based methods and model-based ones has re-
quired several steps.
4.1 Reducibility candidates
The ﬁrst has been the introduction, by Jean-Yves Girard, of the notion of reducibility
candidate in his reduction-based proof of cut elimination for simple type theory
[18,19].
In this proof, to deﬁne the set of reducible proofs of some proposition A, it is
necessary to quantify on the sets of reducible proofs of all propositions B. Thus,
a naive attempt leads to a circular deﬁnition and a way to avoid this circularity is
to introduce a priori a set of sets of proofs, the set of reducibility candidates, and
quantify over all such reducibility candidates instead. Then, it is possible to deﬁne
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the set of reducible proofs of all propositions and it happens a posteriori that these
sets are reducibility candidates.
Introducing this set of reducibility candidates, Jean-Yves Girard has deﬁned the
place where sets of reducible proofs live. Michel Parigot [24] has shown later that
this set of reducibility candidate could be deﬁned in a simple way, as the smallest
set of set of proofs closed by the operations ⇒˜, ∀˜, ...
4.2 Reducibility candidates as truth values
In the cut elimination proofs for various formulations of type theory, in particular in
Benjamin Werner’s proof of cut elimination for the Calculus of inductive construc-
tions [31], the similarity of this assignment of a set of proofs to each proposition
and the assignment of a truth value to each proposition in a model was noticed.
In particular, it is interesting to remark that the model theoretic notation A
has progressively replaced the notation RA for the set of reducible proofs of a propo-
sition A and that the expressions “the interpretation of A” and “the denotation of
A” have progressively replaced the expression “the set of reducible proofs of A”.
4.3 Introducing domains
In [15], we have proposed together with Benjamin Werner a reduction-based cut
elimination proof for a large class of theories in deduction modulo. In deduction
modulo, unlike in type theory, the terms of the theory and the proof-terms are
entities of diﬀerent kinds, as well as the sorts of the language and the propositions.
Thus, it was natural to interpret not only propositions, using reducibility candidates
for truth values, but also terms.
This simpliﬁed our cut elimination proof, in particular because, instead of deﬁn-
ing the interpretation of a predicate symbol as a function mapping terms to truth
values, it was possible to decompose this function in two steps and ﬁrst interpret
the terms in a domain and then deﬁne the interpretation of a predicate symbol as a
function mapping elements of the domain to truth values, as it is usual in models.
This way, a notion of domain of interpretation of terms was introduced in
reduction-based cut elimination proofs and this materialized in a notion of reducibil-
ity candidate valued model, called pre-models.
4.4 Truth values algebras and super-consistency
As already said, the usual notion of bi-valued model can be extended to notions
where the truth values form a boolean algebra or a Heyting algebra. This raises
the question of the possibility to view pre-models as such Heyting algebra valued
models, i.e. the question of the possibility to deﬁne an order on the set of reducibility
candidates that makes it a Heyting algebra. Unfortunately, this is not possible, as in
all Heyting algebras (˜ ⇒˜ ˜) = ˜, but not in the algebra of reducibility candidates.
Thus, to include the algebra of reducibility candidates, the notion of Heyting algebra
had to be generalized to a notion of Truth values algebra [11].
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What relations and operations are needed to use a set as a set of truth values ?
Actually, there is no need for this set to be equipped with an order relation. What
are needed are operations ⇒˜, ∀˜, ∧˜, ... so that propositions can be interpreted and a
notion of positive truth value to characterize valid propositions. For the soundness
theorem to hold, this set of positive truth values must be closed by deduction rules.
For instance, if a ⇒˜ b and a are positive truth values, then b also must be a positive
truth value.
Thierry Coquand [5] has suggested that in such an algebra, it is always possible
to deﬁne a relation ≤ by a ≤ b if a ⇒˜ b is a positive truth value. And he has noticed
that a truth value algebra equipped with such a relation veriﬁes all the properties
of Heyting algebras except one: the antisymmetry of the relation ≤. Thus, truth
values algebras can alternatively be deﬁned as pre-ordered structures with greatest
lower bounds, least upper bounds and relative complementation. Unlike in ordered
structures, greatest lower bounds and least upper bounds are not unique in pre-
ordered structures and, besides the pre-order, the operations ⇒˜, ∀˜, ∧˜, ... must be
given in the deﬁnition of the algebra, as it has to be speciﬁed which greatest lower
bound of a and b the element a ∧˜ b is.
It is well-known that the relation deﬁned on propositions by A ≤ B if A ⇒ B
is provable is reﬂexive and transitive, but that to make it antisymmetric and deﬁne
the Lindenbaum algebra of a language, it is necessary to take the quotient of the
set of propositions by the relation 
 deﬁned by A 
 B if A ⇔ B is provable. An
alternative “solution” is to drop this antisymmetry requirement.
The set of reducibility candidates equipped with the operations ⇒˜, ∀˜, ∧˜, ... is a
truth values algebra and the models valued in this algebra are exactly the pre-models
we had constructed with Benjamin Werner.
Surprisingly, in these constructions, no speciﬁc properties of the algebra of re-
ducibility candidates were used. Thus, they generalize to all truth values algebras.
This has lead to introduce a notion of super-consistency: a theory is super-consistent
it if has a B-valued model, not only for one, but for all truth values algebras B.
Super-consistency is a model theoretic suﬃcient condition for termination of
proof reduction. Whether this condition is necessary is still an open problem.
4.5 From super-consistency to model-based cut elimination proofs
We have noticed with Olivier Hermant that the proof that super-consistency implies
the termination of proof reduction can be simpliﬁed, if we restrict to the goal to
prove that super-consistency implies that all provable propositions have a cut free
proof [14]. In this case, we do not need to establish a property of proofs but merely
a property of propositions and sequents. Thus instead of using an algebra whose
elements are sets of proofs, we can use a simpler algebra whose elements are sets of
sequents: in a reducibility candidate, each proof collapses to its conclusion.
Tait’s lemma, that if π is a proof of a proposition A, then it is an element of
the set A of reducible proofs of A, collapses to the fact that if a sequent Γ  A is
provable then it is a element of A. This model can further be transformed into a
model where truth values are sets of contexts, that form a Heyting algebra, in such
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a way that if Γ ∈ A then Γ  A has a cut free proof, and Tait’s lemma rephrases
as the fact that if a sequent Γ  A is provable then Γ ∈ A.
It is possible to prove that if a sequent Γ  A is valid in this model, then Γ ∈ A
and Tait’s lemma boils down to the fact that if a sequent Γ  A is provable then
it is valid in this model. Like in model-based proofs, this is just the instance of
the soundness lemma corresponding to this model. And indeed the fact that if a
sequent Γ  A is valid in this model, then the Γ ∈ A and thus Γ  A has a cut
free proof is a uniform sharpened completeness theorem.
Conclusion
Step by step, the gap between reduction-based methods and model-based methods
to prove cut elimination has been bridged and, along the way, cut eliminations
has been proved for new theories. Both types of proofs can be decomposed in
two steps, ﬁrst a proof that the theory of interest is super-consistent, then a proof,
independent of the theory of interest, that super-consistency implies cut elimination.
The only diﬀerence is in the choice of the truth value algebra used to deduce cut
elimination from super-consistency: the algebra of reducibility candidates to prove
the termination of proof reduction, the simpler algebra of sequents to construct a
model where validity implies cut free provability.
Once this convergence is achieved, several directions may be worth explor-
ing. First, we may want to deduce directly proof theoretical results form super-
consistency, without proving cut elimination ﬁrst. Second, we may want to extend
the notion of super-consistency to type theory. The recent [6] that relates deduction
modulo and type theory may be a good starting point.
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